![]() ![]() I argue that there are at least two concepts of law of nature worthy of philosophical interest:strong law and weak law. God on this view does not govern the world through external laws of nature, but rather through internal aspects of powerful properties. I will argue that theists should prefer a dispositionalist ontology, since it leads them toward the theory of concurrentism in divine conservation, rather than occasionalism, and revives the distinction between internal and external teleology. Disposition theorists see particulars as being internally powerful rather than being governed by external laws of nature, making external laws in effect ontologically otiose. Recent work in metaphysics and philosophy of science has revived a dispositionalist conception of nature, according to which nature is not passive, but active and dynamic. But what are these laws, metaphysically speaking? I shall argue that laws of nature are not external to the objects they govern, but instead should be thought of as reducible to internal features of properties. How does God govern the world? For many theists “laws of nature” play a vital role. We propose that these conflicting views should be addressed in biological education to promote students’ understanding of contemporary discourses dependent on the different concepts of nature and nurture. The Enlightenment view provided students with means to support gene technology by embedding “nurture” into the concept “nature” by using knowledge while implying that nurture is a natural way to overcome such imperfections of nature. ![]() The Romantic view provided students with moral grounds for consistently preserve what is considered as nature and means to bolster their reasoning by referring to the balance in nature, the purity of nature, and the laws of nature. The students suggested control of human activity on different levels of biological organisation, either from within the Romantic view or the Enlightenment view on nature. Claims presented by upper secondary school students in interviews actualizing the control of human actions pertaining to treatments for hereditary diseases by making use of concepts of “nature” and “naturalness were analysed. We build on the social constructivism view that present conceptions of nature and naturalness emanate from historical and modern social constructions of nature. This study problematizes students’ use of “nature” and “naturalness” to further the development of the experience of science education in relation to the nature-nurture debate. The multitude of meanings of these concepts and their roles in societal discourses can impede students’ development of understanding for different perspectives, e.g. The conflicts between nature and nurture are brought to the fore and challenges socio-scientific decision-making in science education. ![]() Furthermore, by tightening up the terms of the debate, we see that the common claim that a conception of ‘laws of nature’ only emerges in the Scientific Revolution is built on a superficial reading of the ancient evidence. By looking at the many intersections of law and nature in antiquity, this paper shows that such a sharp distinction is overly simplistic, and often relies crucially on the imposition of an artificial and anachronistic suppression of the role of gods or divinity in the worlds of ancient natural philosophy. Questions about the historical origins and development of claims that nature is lawlike are generally treated as entirely distinct from the development of ethical natural law theories. On the other hand there are schools of philosophy that seek to justify ethics generally, or legal theory specifically, in conceptions of nature. On the one hand, we frequently talk of nature as being lawlike or as obeying laws. The relationship between conceptions of law and conceptions of nature is a complex one, and proceeds on what appear to be two distinct fronts. ![]()
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